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C H A P T E R T H R E E 
Prospects for Worker Participation in 
Management in the Single Market 
Lowell Turner 
X->UROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION'S takeoff since the mid-1980s is 
among the more unexpected and dramatic stories on the world stage in 
a period in which surprises have abounded. Driven by their own fears of 
perceived stagnation, "Eurosclerosis," policymakers at national and Eu-
ropean levels coalesced around a single European market project which 
promised to transform the EC's supposedly tired old welfare states into 
a juggernaut of economic dynamism. 
As many have pointed out, business and government have led this 
project; it is essentially a market deregulatory project into which labor, 
with little choice or initial participation, was pulled along.1 The project 
moves forward at a time of union decline and weakness in most EC coun-
tries; and it is precisely in opposition to many labor-supported market 
regulations that major business actors can agree. As labor has attempted 
to get back into the rapidly developing European game, a defense of 
social standards and protections at the European level and within the 
member states has become a critical union strategy and a major battle-
ground on which employer and worker interests meet. 
This paper examines the development of and debates over the so-called 
social dimension of the single market project, with particular reference to 
the issues of employee information, consultation, and participation rights. 
The Social Charter, issued by the European Commission and agreed to in 
This paper has benefited substantially from the detailed comments and suggestions of 
George Strauss, who provided the inspiration for this study. Michael Belzer, Oliver Clarke, 
Owen Darbishire, Michael Reich, Jacques Rojot, Nick Salvatore, David Soskice, Robert 
Stern, Wolfgang Streeck, Lloyd Ulman, Harold Wilensky, and John Windmuller also gave 
careful readings to an earlier draft and provided useful comments and criticisms. 
1. Sandholtz and Zysman (1989); Mosley (1990); Streeck (1991). 
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December 1989 by eleven of the twelve member states of the Council of 
Ministers, lists the expansion of such rights as one of its planks. In prin-
ciple, therefore, most employers, governments, and unions are in agree-
ment; the problem comes in implementation and regulation. 
Unions by and large favor expanded legal rights to worker participa-
tion in management (WPM), both at European and national levels; this 
sort of WPM is referred to as negotiated.2 Employers, on the other hand, 
favor voluntary arrangements that often turn out in practice to be 
employer led. The distinction between negotiated and employer-led 
WPM is at the heart of the European debate on this issue, a debate that 
shows every sign of evoking a protracted process of negotiation and po-
litical mobilization involving unions, employers, national governments, 
and the European Commission, Parliament, and Council.3 
This is a high-stakes issue: for unions attempting to remain major 
actors in the rapidly changing new Europe; for employers seeking new 
input and productivity from employees as well as managerial freedom 
and control; for proponents of new post-Fordist production models that 
include employee involvement and closer labor-management coopera-
tion; for social democratic advocates of expanded industrial democracy; 
for national governments balancing conflicting claims of domestic inter-
est groups; for the European Commission and Parliament, each seeking 
to give substance to a popular social dimension in the unleashed Euro-
pean market integration project. And not only is WPM a critical issue in 
its own right: the European debates surrounding WPM also serve as a 
lens shedding light on the broader prospects for social policy in a single 
European market—the social Europe debate. 
While WPM is indeed spreading in Europe as one aspect of market-
driven production reorganization, the employer-led variety has largely 
accounted for this expansion. At the European level, the union-social 
democratic campaign for negotiated WPM (which has gained in intensity 
since 1988 but which actually dates to the early 1970s) has met so far 
with little success. 
The reasons for this lie in politics and institutional configurations. 
2. For shorthand purposes, the abbreviation WPM is used, as in Strauss (1982). 
3. The Council of Ministers, composed of ministers from the twelve member states, is 
the EC's decisionmaking body. The Commission is the administrative body; it proposes 
legislation for discussion in Parliament and decision by the Council. The European Parlia-
ment, with proportionally represented elected delegates from every member state, is pri-
marily a discussion forum, with little formal power other than certain veto rights. 
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Employer-led WPM is the default outcome and is often initiated in order 
to forestall negotiated WPM.4 Negotiated WPM requires specialized in-
stitutions (especially works councils) and unions that are strong and co-
hesive enough to use these institutions effectively. In those nations where 
both of these requirements are met, negotiated WPM exists and arguably 
has grown in importance in the past decade. This is true especially or 
Germany but also of the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, and countries 
outside the EC such as Sweden. Where one or both of these r equ i rem e n t s 
are lacking, negotiated WPM has made less headway. At the E u r o p e a n 
level, unions have lacked the strength and cohesion to play a leading r o i e 
in institution building; the necessary institutions for negotiated WPNl are 
absent as well. Employers and their political allies have had sufficient 
strength within the single market effort to prevent adoption of regula-
tions and creation of institutions that are not to their liking. Therefore 
amid the current dynamics of European integration, the political a n d 
institutional requirements for expanding negotiated WPM have been 
missing. 
Strauss has identified four principal kinds of WPM: direct (quali ty 
circles, teamwork, semiautonomous work groups); profit-sharing; w o r k s 
councils; and company board membership.5 Broadly speaking, the hrst 
two are identified with employer-led WPM initiatives while the latter two 
are negotiated, including active union participation in the establish!*16111 
of such forums. The lines have blurred in recent years: while most u r u ° n s 
continue to prefer wage increases to profit-sharing, they have in n o t a b l e 
cases taken a new interest in direct participation by groups of w o r k e r s 
(e.g., the promotion of group work6). Employers, for their part, have 
accepted works councils and employee board membership where these 
are mandated by law, by central bargaining agreement, or both but have 
continued to oppose them elsewhere (in particular EC countries a n 0 - at 
the European level). Renewed employer interest in direct p a r t i c i p ^ t l o n 
and profit-sharing is driven by changing market circumstances; and these 
employer-led forms of WPM appear to be spreading in Europe ^s m 
' 4. Some theorists of worker participation, especially those who fall into the conf l i c t " or 
opposition-oriented camp, make a distinction between pseudoparticipation (employe r " l e ' 
in which management defines the issues to be considered) and more substantive par t i c *P a ~ 
tion (negotiated). For a brief, useful discussion of this and other perspectives on p a r t i c i p a -
tion, see Stern (1988, pp. 397-98). 
5. Strauss (1991). 
6. Turner (1991, pp. 111-17). 
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the United States. Nevertheless, the European debate concerns nego-
tiated WPM.7 
The contemporary expansion of WPM and the surrounding debates 
are not driven primarily by Europe 1992 processes but by the same forces 
pushing European governments toward greater integration. These forces 
include intensified world market competition, the rise of Japanese pro-
duction models (which include integrated enterprise unions), the rapid 
spread of microelectronic technologies, and managerial imperatives to 
reorganize production and work. 
Employers have discovered in many cases that reorganization is more 
effective and that productivity and flexibility can be increased if em-
ployees are consulted in advance and on a regular basis, Japanese pro-
duction models that include some direct WPM in the office and on the 
shop floor are particularly instructive. Many unions have discovered that 
in these reorganization processes, union influence is best preserved where 
some form of negotiated WPM obtains.8 Both sides have felt pressure 
within their ranks arising from new demands for participation and voice, 
especially from younger workers and white collar, technical, and profes-
sional employees (whose numbers are growing). Therefore, both employ-
ers and unions in most EC countries are promoting various, and often 
quite different, forms of WPM. In this context, the drive toward Euro-
pean economic integration has served both to accelerate the urgency of 
these projects and provide a new battleground at the European level 
where the different concepts contend. 
Thus, WPM is spreading but in quite different ways. The specific 
shape and direction of change or expansion varies considerably from 
country to country, depending on existing national institutions and the 
political capacities of employers, unions, and governments. Although 
WPM has yet to spread widely at the European level (in multinational 
works councils, board participation, information committees, or bar-
7. Despite their importance profit-sharing or direct employee participation will only be 
considered in passing. Various forms of direct participation, especially quality circles and 
teamwork, are gaining in importance in Europe as managers seek to respond to new Japa-
nese competitive challenges by adopting elements of Japanese production practice. 
As for the two levels of negotiated WPM, works councils are clearly the more important 
forum, while EC proposals concerning works councils have provoked the most heated de-
bate. We thus focus on works councils as the critical aspect of negotiated WPM, with a 
secondary look at company board participation. For a discussion of the problems and usual 
atrophy of employer-organized direct participation, see Strauss (1991). For an argument 
that worker directors have little effect on company board operations, see Batstone and 
Davies (1976) and Stern (1988, pp. 404-5). 
8. Turner (1991). 
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gaining), numerous plans have been proposed—both for individual firms 
and for multinationals in general. There is currently a major EC-financed 
effort to establish cross-national information committees at large Euro-
pean firms (see below). But the long-term success of such Europe-wide 
initiatives will depend to a large extent on WPM developments within 
the member states as well as on the balance of forces and the outcomes 
of political debate at the European level. 
Left to their own devices, employers would be content to pursue their 
own WPM initiatives with little help from the EC or the unions. Unions 
are the major promoters of expanded, negotiated WPM. This is true be-
cause intensified international competition has placed national, regional, 
and firm-level collective bargaining under stress. As employers have 
moved to reorganize work, negotiations have tended to shift to lower 
levels, leading to widespread decentralization of bargaining.9 WPM is a 
way for unions to maintain their influence under these new circum-
stances. And at the same time as increasing international competition has 
put cross-national bargaining on the agenda for unions, new require-
ments for WPM at the European level (for firms doing business in more 
than one EC state) afford a possible means for unions to gain a toehold 
in multinational bargaining. 
Germany now has the largest economy in the EC; German employers, 
unions, and the federal government all make their voices heard in Euro-
pean circles. Moreover, in Germany unions have stayed strong, so that 
the expansion of WPM, rooted in national legislation, has been negoti-
ated and in some cases even union led (primarily through works councils 
at the firm and plant levels). In most of the other eleven member states, 
by contrast, unions have declined over the past decade both in member-
ship density and in influence; and in several of these countries, WPM has 
neither statutory backing nor the backing of a central national agree-
ment. The expansion of WPM in most of these countries, therefore, has 
been largely employer led. On balance then, in spite of the fact that Ger-
many has both the dominant economy and most entrenched WPM ar-
rangements, the spread of WPM throughout the EC as a whole has been 
largely voluntary and along employer models. This is true so far also at 
the European level, where employers have insisted on guidelines rather 
than binding legislation in the areas of information, consultation, and 
participation for employees. 
This is the crux of the current debate over the social dimension within 
9. Locke (1990). 
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the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and Parliament. Unions and 
their political allies want binding measures to "reregulate" the European 
single market so as to afford the basic social protections currently em-
bodied in national legislation. Employers and their political allies sup-
port statements of principle (such as the Social Charter) to guide volun-
tary implementation of social advances such as WPM at the level of the 
individual firm.10 
European-level developments thus reflect national developments and 
diversity. German unions, following the model that has served the expan-
sion of their own influence so well, are the main proponents of expanded 
participation rights for workers and unions.11 They are currently pre-
occupied with unification, however. Union weakness in other member 
states combined with overall employer strength in what has so far been 
a business-oriented single market project has prevented adoption of 
binding measures for WPM at the European level. It has also ensured 
that the spread of participation is for the most part voluntary and em-
ployer led. 
The following sections examine the history of the European debate on 
negotiated WPM, the recent union-led campaign and current stalemate, 
the first European-level works councils, and the existing national bases 
for negotiated WPM. The evidence shows the continued importance of 
this issue. It points to a substantial amount of national-level WPM in 
several member states (especially Germany) within an overall pattern of 
wide cross-national diversity; the great difficulty of building institutions 
in Europe today, especially those addressing the expansion of employee 
and union rights; and continued employer dominance within the single 
European market project. 
WPM and the European Community: The History of 
the Debate 
Unions and their social democratic or socialist allies were early postwar 
supporters of the European Economic Community, hoping to build 
union influence and social protections through new Europe-wide insti-
10. See, for example, Rhodes (1991) on the broad European struggle between neo-
liberals and neocorporatists, labor market deregulation and reregulation, competitive flex-
ibility and constructive flexibility. 
11. And comparative research supports the notion that participation works best when 
backed up by legislation. See IDE (1981). 
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tutions. However, the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957 mainly by con-
servative governments of the initial six member states, adopted a mini-
malist position on social policy.12 
By the 1970s, however, the European Commission had begun advo-
cating a more interventionist position on social issues. This view gained 
in influence as the Social Democratic party (SPD) came to power in West 
Germany, the Labour party took over in Britain (following Britain's entry 
into the EEC in 1973), and waves of strikes in various countries begin-
ning in 1968 heralded a resurgence in class conflict in western Europe.13 
A new period of European-level social activism began around 1974. The 
current debates over the social dimension, including those surrounding 
WPM, have their roots in this period. Thus Mosley identifies three peri-
ods for European social policy: 1958-73, the period of benign neglect; 
1974-85, the period of social activism; and 1987 to the present, the 
social dimension period, sparked by the new single market project.14 
Social Activism: 1974-85 
In the mid- to late 1970s, the Council of Ministers approved directives 
to expand worker rights in health and safety, plant closings and mass 
dismissals, firm bankruptcies and changes of ownership, and equal op-
portunity. After 1979, however, further initiatives were frustrated by 
the rise of conservative governments, conservative economic policy, 
and most dramatically by Prime Minister Thatcher's "Mrs. No" per-
spective.15 Compared to the aspirations of Europeanist social activists, 
achievements of this period were modest. In particular, several initiatives 
to expand WPM rights for employees were unsuccessful. 
The European Commission made three proposals relating to WPM 
during this period. First was the Fifth Directive on Company Law, pro-
posed in 1972, aimed at ensuring employee participation on the boards 
of public companies (that is, most large European firms). The draft di-
rective recognized the need for flexibility in implementation according to 
divergent existing national arrangements; but the intent was to regularize 
Community-wide WPM at the top levels of management.16 
12. Teague and Grahl (1989, p. 170). 
13. Crouch and Pizzorno (1978). 
14. Mosley (1990, pp. 149-57). 
15. Teague and Grahl (1989, p. 170); Dworkin and Lee (1990, pp. 8ff). 
16. Pipkorn (1984, pp. 60-66); Northrup and others (1988, p. 529); Teague (1989a, 
pp. 313-14). 
j 2 / Lowell Turner 
Second was the European Company Statute, proposed in 1975, which 
offered firms the option of incorporating as European firms for cross-
national investment and trade purposes. The proposed statute included 
provisions to ensure WPM in the new European firms, including a Com-
munity-wide works council for each such firm, supervisory board partic-
ipation for employee representatives, and the possibility of Community-
wide collective bargaining.17 
Third was the Vredeling directive (named after then EEC Social Af-
fairs Commissioner Henk Vredeling, a Dutch socialist), proposed in 
1980. It was aimed at expanding and harmonizing employee information 
and consultation rights in "complex organizations" (again, most large 
European concerns) throughout the EEC.18 The Vredeling directive 
turned out to be the most controversial of all three proposals, giving rise 
to intense controversy at the European level—in the Council, Commis-
sion, Parliament, and other forums. 
All three measures were discussed and debated at length at the Euro-
pean level and within the member states. All three were revised and re-
written, shunted back and forth among numerous committees, the Com-
mission and the Council; all the while they were debated, at times quite 
fiercely, in the European Parliament. The proposals were justified on the 
basis of articles of the original EEC treaty, such as Article 100, calling 
for harmonization of economic activities and approximation of laws in 
the member nations.19 At various times, the discussion focused on one or 
the other of these measures. By the early 1980s the debate had become 
intense and around 1983—84, it came to focus on the Vredeling directive 
(which is still today referred to as the notorious Vredeling proposal in 
employer-oriented publications). 
The most active supporters of these measures were trade union orga-
nizations such as the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and 
the European Metalworkers Federation (EMF). Employers, organized at 
the European level through the Union of Industrial and Employers' Con-
federations of Europe (UNICE), most actively opposed inclusion of man-
datory WPM within the two directives and the European Company Stat-
ute. Although both the ETUC and UNICE, as well as other organizations 
17. Pipkorn (1984, pp. 66-68). 
18. Pipkorn (1984, pp. 56-60); Northrup and others (1988, pp. 528-29); Dworkin 
and Lee (1990, p. 11). 
19. Pipkorn (1984, pp. 49-54). Eurojargon is an unfortunate affliction with which all 
students of contemporary European integration must contend. Harmonization and approx-
imation are terms that refer to the necessity for EC member states to bring their diverse 
economic policies and laws into line with one another—falling short, however, of identity. 
See, for example, Kolvenbach (1990). 
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representing cross-national worker and employer interests (for instance, 
at the sectoral level) were only loosely organized, they provided impor-
tant forums and lobbying vehicles for their various constituent interests, 
especially in the debates over WPM. 
National unions were far from unanimous on these issues. French 
unions, for example, were much less enthusiastic about any kind of co-
determination than were their German counterparts. But within inter-
national forums such as the ETUC, German union support, backed by 
the Belgians, Dutch, and Danes, was more than enough to overcome 
indifference (or even occasional hostility) from the French unions and 
others. Thus the ETUC could for the most part speak with one voice in 
support of the three measures.20 Employers, on the other hand, viewed 
such legislation as an infringement on their authority especially in coun-
tries where such arrangements were not entrenched. An oversimplified 
way to view the debate that nonetheless captures the essence of the po-
litical conflict is to see German unions as the primary advocates opposed 
by French, Italian, and British employers. 
By the early 1980s, however, when these debates came to a head, the 
timing of events worked against labor. Under the leadership of Reagan 
and Thatcher, conservative economic policy prevailed (by 1983 even in 
socialist France). Thatcher and the Tories came to power in Britain in 
1979; the historic compromise including the Communist party fell apart 
in Italy in the same year; Kohl and his coalition led by the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) replaced the SPD in West Germany in 1982; 
and in socialist France unions remained fragmented and weak. Under the 
impact of a deep recession in 1980—82, combined with employer and 
government challenges, unions declined in influence almost everywhere 
in the EEC except West Germany. Unions and social democrats pro-
moted the Vredeling directive vigorously, in part to reclaim at the Euro-
pean level some of the influence they were losing at home. But employer 
opposition was adamant and powerful. The social dialogue of the pre-
vious years bogged down, and no new European social policy was en-
acted after 1980.21 Ruling out any vestige of hope of a reemergence, 
Prime Minister Thatcher perfected the art of casting vetoes on the law-
making Council.22 
20. The communist CGT, the French union federation most hostile to participation 
concepts, remained one of the few European union federations outside the ETUC. 
21 . Venturini (1989, p. 21); Dworkin and Lee (1990, pp. 8-11). 
22. There was an additional factor contributing to the Vredeling directive's defeat in 
the early 1980s: the expensive campaign waged in Brussels and among the member states 
by lobbyists for American-based firms. As the Economist put it, "Europe's unions are no 
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Achievements of this period were disappointing compared to the as-
pirations of the Europeanist social activists. All three WPM initiatives 
were unsuccessful. The Vredeling proposal was shelved in 1986, pre-
cisely the year in which the Single European Act launched the drive to-
ward the 1992 single market. 
The Social Dimension: 1987 to the Present 
Observers have argued that world economic problems since the mid-
1970s, and specifically the intractable economic difficulties faced by 
western European societies, are related to new challenges faced by the 
dominant Fordist production system.23 As the Japanese reinvented pro-
duction, modifying traditional concepts to produce high-quality goods 
at low cost and enhancing their capacity to change product offerings 
quickly, European firms were forced to begin their own processes of re-
organization in order to remain competitive. By the early 1980s, these 
processes included rapid technological change, challenges to union influ-
ence and established shop floor bases (contributing to union decline), 
expanded employer-led WPM (to motivate workers and elicit work force 
contributions to productivity growth), and widespread decentralization 
of industrial relations. However, in the eyes of many European business 
leaders (especially the Roundtable of European Industrialists) and gov-
ernment policymakers, the pace of change was too slow. European firms 
were falling behind, unable to keep up with Japanese growth rates, pro-
ductivity increases, investment levels, or market shares. It was also clear 
that the United States was unable to provide either the leadership or 
resources to guide Europe out of its economic doldrums. In the face of 
these new problems, European business and government leaders, orga-
nized by Jacques Delors of the European Commission, launched the 
single market project to spur the needed levels of investment and pro-
cesses of reorganization.24 
Thus the same world market forces and political responses were driv-
ing union decline, production reorganization, decentralization of indus-
trial relations, expanded employer-led WPM, and Europe 1992. The 
single market project was initiated, as a product of political negotiation, 
match for America's multinationals" (October 16, 1982, p. 77). See also a follow-up article 
in the Economist, June 25, 1983, p. 54. 
23. See Piore and Sabel (1984); Boyer (1988); Teague and Grahl (1990, pp. 170-72). 
24. Sandholtz and Zysman (1989). 
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by an alliance between large businesses, governments, and European 
elites based on business and government deregulation goals of the 1980s. 
Labor was in effect excluded from the project in its takeoff period when 
unions (and the Left generally) were in decline in much of the Commu-
nity. At the same time, labor's opposition to deregulation was neutralized 
by traditional unions' and social democrats' support for European inte-
gration.25 
As events unfolded, the severe threat this deregulatory project posed 
for established national bases of union influence became clear. Therefore, 
beginning around 1988, national unions organized at the European level 
through the ETUC seriously began to take up the banner of the social 
dimension. Labor would agree to and support open markets in return 
for upward harmonization of social standards and protections at the Eu-
ropean level. But labor was not the only proponent. Several EC govern-
ments and even business in some quarters (notably Germany) expressed 
interest in a social dimension—to prevent social unrest, perhaps, but 
more importantly to head off capital flight from northern Europe to 
southern Europe. There were thus two main sources of interest in the 
new social dimension. Unions saw it as a means to protect and improve 
worker standards and to maintain or rebuild union influence at national 
and European levels. Second, certain governments and employers sup-
ported it to prevent social dumping, which could choke the high produc-
tivity growth anticipated in the single market vision. 
Much of the social dimension is in fact noncontroversial, at least for 
all EC countries except Britain. There is broad agreement on such issues 
as the free mobility of workers, structural funds (to transfer money from 
wealthier to poorer countries for training and employment projects, in-
frastructure, and so on), and the convergence of national labor market 
policy in such areas as social security, worker training and job creation.26 
But for such issues as the length of the work week, regulation of part-
time and temporary work, and employee information, consultation, and 
participation rights, controversy has been intense. Employers and their 
political allies continue to resist any binding measures in these areas with 
the same intensity they demonstrated in earlier battles against the Vre-
deling proposal and the inclusion of mandatory WPM in the draft Fifth 
Directive and the European Company Statute.27 
Jacques Delors, backed by French President Mitterrand, has played an 
25. Streeck (1991). 
26. Teague and Grahl (1989, p. 55). 
27. See Teague and Grahl (1989, pp. 55-58). 
j 6 I Lowell Turner 
important role in the social dimension debate. Some observers contend 
that the turn toward conservative economic policy by these French so-
cialists made the Europe 1992 project possible.28 But along with his pro-
motion of the single market, Delors called early on for the inclusion of 
social protections. First, he initiated the so-called Val Duchesse dialogue 
between representatives of business and labor and charged the Economic 
and Social Committee of the European Commission (including both em-
ployer and union representatives) with developing social proposals. But 
progress was slow as employers sought mutual understandings rather 
than binding measures, especially in such areas as labor relations and 
WPM. The ETUC complained that labor remained excluded in any sub-
stantive way from the 1992 project. Delors then chose the ETUC confer-
ence in Stockholm in 1988 to launch the campaign for a social charter. 
Fundamental to this vision of a social Europe were expanded informa-
tion, consultation, and participation rights for employees, a position that 
Delors articulated forcefully.29 
In spite of national differences—German and Dutch unions, for ex-
ample, strongly favored WPM; others were less enthusiastic—the ETUC 
passed a strongly worded resolution in favor of a social charter that in-
cluded significant WPM provisions. In December of the same year, the 
ETUC officially adopted its own Community Charter on Social Rights, 
endorsed by all thirty-six member union confederations. The charter in-
cluded a call for WPM rights for all employees in the European Com-
munity, and demanded that the entire charter be legally binding.30 
The social Europe battle had begun, with WPM as a major focus-of 
the debate. When a social charter proposed by the Commission was 
adopted in somewhat watered-down form in December 1989 by eleven 
of the twelve member states, debate merely shifted to the implementation 
process—the action program and related measures. Proponents of the 
charter and action program included the ETUC, the European Commis-
sion, and the European Parliament. German unionists continued to play 
a leading role within the ETUC. On the participation issue, they were 
now backed not only by the Danes, Belgians, and Dutch, but increasingly 
by the British, Italians, and Spaniards who claimed to have learned from 
28. Sandholtz and Zysman (1989). 
29. See, for example, the reporting of this event in Industrial Relations Europe, vol. 16, 
(June 1988), p. 1. See also Silvia (1991, pp. 633-34). And Delors kept to this position: in 
1990, he continued to place information, consultation, and participation rights among "the 
most urgent aspects of the Commission's Action Program," Lodge (1990, p. 147). 
30. Silvia (1991, pp. 633-34). 
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their reverses of the 1980s and now saw the value of statutory WPM. 
Within and beyond the Social Charter, the ETUC promoted information 
and consultation rights (in works councils or consultation committees), 
worker directors on company boards, and cross-national Community-
wide bargaining for firms with branches in more than one member 
country. The ETUC supported a new version of the European Company 
Statute and envisioned revised versions of the Fifth Directive and the 
Vredeling proposal as aspects of implementing the Social Charter. 
Commission officials (including Delors) argued that WPM offered 
protection against the spread of social dumping, which could wreck the 
single market project; that WPM made for better management, of which 
German economic success was strong evidence; and that it was impos-
sible to offer firms an option such as European incorporation unless some 
form of negotiated WPM was included, since several member states had 
this already.31 
The European Parliament also emerged as a strong supporter of the 
Social Charter and its WPM measures. Many of its members had run on 
platforms espousing a social dimension (including WPM) in the 1989 
elections. The Left (broadly defined) claimed 261 seats to 242 for the 
Right; and among the delegates of the Right were many Christian dem-
ocratic supporters of a strong social dimension.32 Although still mainly a 
debating forum, the Parliament began to use the popular social dimen-
sion to increase its own voice, putting pressure on Delors and the Com-
mission to propose strong measures.33 In the summer of 1990, the Eu-
ropean Parliament, backed by a large majority, called for extensive and 
binding WPM, declaring that it expected directives to this end from the 
Commission as part of the action program as well as new legislation to 
establish a framework for cross-national collective bargaining.34 
The employers' confederation, UNICE, agreed for the most part with 
the idea of the charter as a statement of principle, as long as implemen-
tation was to occur by means of "subsidiarity" (that is, decisionmaking 
31. It should be noted that these are three quite different arguments, likely to be sup-
ported by quite different interests (German employers, for instance, might support the first, 
government officials and intellectuals the second, and unions the third). The Commission 
has thus aimed to be all things to all people, which accounts in part for its great difficulty 
in producing broadly acceptable specific measures on the issue of WPM in Europe. 
32. "European Parliament Election Results," European Industrial Relations Review, 
vol. 186 (July 1989), p. 2. 
33. Lodge (1990, pp. 147-48). 
34. "Parliament Wants EC Labour Court, Bargaining Rules," Industrial Relations Eu-
rope, vol. 18 (September 1990), p. 2. 
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and implementation performed at the lowest possible level). In general, 
employers favored a social dimension in order to improve industrial 
competitiveness, but not to expand industrial democracy. UNICE took a 
consistent and active position against any measures that would obligate 
firms to expand worker participation. As in the earlier battles over the 
Vredeling proposal, European employers were reinforced in this position 
by vigorous and well-financed lobbying by the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce delegation in Brussels. 
The most vociferous opponent of the Social Charter and any proposed 
expansion of WPM rights remained the British government. Although 
the Commission diluted the provisions of the charter to gain British sup-
port, the Thatcher government in the end refused to vote for it. Any hint 
of WPM rights elicited the British government's veto threat in the Coun-
cil. As Thatcher put it: "I say to people on the Continent: 'Stop talking 
about worker participation in business management. You are back in the 
Marxist era!'"35 Two poles of opinion could, therefore, be defined: a 
maximalist position on the social dimension supported by the unions, 
Parliament, and the Commission; and a minimalist position supported 
by employers and Britain.36 
In December 1990, as part of the Social Charter's action program, the 
Commission issued a new draft directive calling for the establishment of 
European works councils at large firms (those with more than 1,000 em-
ployees total and with at least one hundred employees doing business in 
two or more EC countries).37 This appeared to be a more flexible version 
of the defeated Vredeling directive—so flexible in fact that it was sharply 
criticized by IG Metall President Franz Steinkiihler.38 Criticism of this 
new European works council legislation escalated in early 1991: while 
labor found it "too timid and limited," UNICE attacked it as harmful to 
business, management authority, and free bargaining.39 
Meanwhile, the Fifth Directive found new life as part of the social 
dimension; although the possible forms of representation became in-
creasingly flexible as the debate proceeded, employers continued to op-
35. Interview with the editors of Readers' Digest, published first in a newspaper adver-
tisement, International Herald Tribune, April 19, 1989, p. 13. 
36. Teague(1989a,p. 326). 
37. "Draft Directive on European Works Councils," European Industrial Relations Re-
view, vol. 204, (January 1991), p. 2. 
38. Steinkiihler criticized it for applying only to very large firms and for allowing firms 
to withhold extensive information on the grounds of business secrecy. 
39. "Euro-Company Statute 'Should Give Workers More Say,'" Industrial Relations 
Europe, vol. 19 (March 1991), p. 1. 
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pose any attempt to mandate employee participation on company 
boards. The proposed European Company Statute offered three forms of 
participation: supervisory board (the German model); works committee 
(the French model); or any other negotiated version agreed to by both 
labor and management (the Swedish model).40 
In the meantime, WPM cropped up in a variety of different forms for 
specific issues. For health and safety, for example, firm-level joint com-
mittees were included in European Commission directives. More contro-
versial, however, were directives concerning the introduction of new 
technology and the regulation of temporary and part-time work which 
called for labor-management information sharing and consultation. The 
WPM issue refused to go away; if anything, the debates showed signs of 
expanding and intensifying in the early 1990s. 
With the opening of eastern Europe in 1989 and the unification of 
Germany in 1990, European economic (and possibly political) integra-
tion took on a new urgency.41 EC policymakers prepared a second round 
of integration initiatives, encompassing steps toward monetary and po-
litical union. Driven in part by this urgency but also by frustration at the 
lagging pace of social initiatives, policymakers at the Commission and in 
the member states began a new effort in late 1990 to expand the concept 
and practice of qualified majority voting. 
A key provision of the Single European Act passed in 1986 was to 
require qualified majority voting on the Council of Ministers instead of 
traditional EC unanimity for measures aimed at implementing the single 
European market. This provision was critical in speeding up the 
decisionmaking process and making further economic integration pos-
sible. But Article 100A of the Single European Act specifically excluded 
"the rights and interests of employed persons" from majority voting. As 
a result, social issues such as health and safety were eligible for majority 
voting; meanwhile others such as WPM, precisely the most controversial 
issues, required unanimity. And the British government, at least under 
Thatcher, was outspoken in its intent to use its veto power to block new 
information, consultation, or participation rights for employees.42 
40. "Criticism Grows on All Sides over Euro-Council Draft," Industrial Relations Eu-
rope, vol. 19 (February 1991), p. 1. 
41. Story (1990, p. 165). 
42. Peter Lange has persuasively argued that Britain's propensity to veto in a voting 
system requiring unanimity has made possible all kinds of "cheap talk" by the other mem-
ber governments, who are free to posture to please domestic groups on such issues as the 
social dimension. In the absence of a British veto threat or given a shift to qualified majority 
voting, the apparent widespread support for social issues including WPM could become 
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As the social debate escalated, the demand for majority voting inten-
sified. Already in 1989, the European Parliament had called for broad 
majority voting to implement the Social Charter.43 In August 1990, Italy 
proposed that the Council adopt majority voting for labor and social 
legislation, to speed up policy-making. At year's end, Belgium submitted 
its plan to have qualified majority voting extend to all labor issues. But 
the legal and political reality remained unchanged: it required unanimity 
on the Council to shift to majority voting. 
A breakthrough on the issue of qualified majority voting finally came 
in late 1991 in the form of the "midnight surprise" social protocol ap-
pended to the New Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht. 
Eleven countries agreed to shift to qualified majority voting for many 
social issues, including information and consultation, but not participa-
tion. (Britain again opted out.) In addition, the social partners, UNICE 
and the ETUC, were given expanded authority to negotiate broad agree-
ment on issues such as WPM. By mid-1992, however, it was still not clear 
whether the Maastricht Treaty would be ratified, nor was it clear 
whether the social partners would succeed in negotiating agreement or 
whether member governments were prepared to use qualified majority 
voting in pursuit of social goals. 
So the debate continued. Some were prepared to declare labor's defeat 
on the social dimension, at least in the short run.44 A new strain of Euro-
pessimism took hold, which saw in the 1992 deregulation effort labor's 
failure to recreate institutions of regulation at the European level (for 
such purposes as collective bargaining and WPM) and the gradual ero-
sion of such bases of union influence at the national level.45 Outcomes 
for all social issues including WPM, however, remained uncertain, sub-
ject to political conflict and negotiation.46 At the very least, the Social 
Charter represented a benchmark for those at the national and European 
levels seeking to expand social rights in areas such as WPM.47 But by 
1992, although there had been considerable negotiation and debate, no 
concrete measures had been adopted by the Council to implement any 
controversial aspect of the charter, WPM included. In other words, the 
much weaker (remarks from a presentation at a Western Societies program seminar, Cornell 
University, March 8, 1991). 
43. Mosley(1990, p. 157). 
44. Silvia (1991). 
45. Mosley (1990); Streeck (1991). 
46. Teague (1989a); Lodge (1990); Story (1990). 
47. Lodge (1990, pp. 140-41). 
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minimalists have so far won out. This is not surprising given the current 
balance of political forces, a decade of union decline in most countries, 
employer leadership in the 1992 project, and the current economic slow-
down. 
Multinational Works Councils and Community-wide 
Bargaining 
In spite of extensive speculation and discussion as well as occasional 
advocacy from European unions and the ETUC, there has been virtually 
no multinational labor-management bargaining in Europe to date.48 
With very few exceptions, unions have yet to produce fully developed 
proposals for multinational bargaining or to mobilize cross-nationally in 
support of such a goal. The closest efforts in this direction so far have 
been a few cases of European-level works councils that have been rec-
ognized by management. 
In June 1988 the European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) took a 
position in favor of works councils at the firm level with specified rights 
to information and consultation for companies with operations in more 
than one European country. IG Metall President Steinkiihler endorsed 
this concept in a major public campaign including press releases, a con-
ference, and a book on unions and the social dimension.49 Since then, the 
European Metalworkers' Federation has worked with numerous cross-
national groups of unions seeking to establish such committees or coun-
cils, with recent funding support from the European Commission. 
Employers, however, have shown great reluctance. The "EMF model" 
was at first officially recognized only at two French-based multinationals, 
Bull and Thomson. The latter was the first of its kind, dating from a 
1986 agreement between Thomson and the European Metalworkers' 
Federation.50 Such agreements, which the federation is working to 
spread, establish information and consultation committees for union 
work force representatives from the various countries in which the firm 
operates. The federation has referred to the Thomson experience as the 
first European works council. 
A similar agreement exists at BSN, a French multinational in the food 
48. Union initiatives began in the 1970s with the establishment of sectoral Interna-
tional Trade Secretariats, but these were largely ignored by employers. 
49. See Steinkiihler (1989, pp. 16-19). 
50. Northrup and others (1988, pp. 532-33); Baun (1990, pp. 21-22). 
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business.51 From a union point of view, the shortcoming in these three 
experiences is that they have largely proven to be employer led, and the 
firms concerned are based in a country where unions are weak. Even to 
the extent that employers are willing to accept such arrangements, they 
are opposed to allowing them to develop beyond the stage of information 
committees and into more active WPM. As Northrup, Campbell, and 
Slowinski put it, "Multinational employers, even those who have partic-
ipated in such consultative mechanisms, are likely to resist any pressure, 
whether from union or governmental sources, that would transform con-
sultation into negotiation."51 
In an effort to provide a more advanced model of European-level 
WPM, in 1990 the general works council at Volkswagen in Germany 
initiated the establishment of a European works council composed of 
representatives from VW and Audi in Germany, VW in Belgium, and 
SEAT in Spain (owned by VW). VW management was present at the 
founding meeting and in February 1992 officially recognized the council 
and its right to meet at company expense, receive information, and dis-
cuss issues of strategic importance with management. The VW effort is 
in part a response to the tedious decisionmaking process at the EC con-
cerning worker rights; and the VW European works council members 
are explicit in their intent to set an example that will inspire other cross-
national union collaborations as well as influence the work of the Euro-
pean Commission.53 The works council and union at VW have at im-
portant junctures in the past served as a model for the German labor 
movement and for labor-management relations. The extension of this 
role to the European level is a much more ambitious, complicated, and 
problematic undertaking. 
There is currently an effort under way to establish additional cross-
national information committees (now referred to as European works 
councils, or EWCs) at a number of large European multinational corpo-
rations. Organizing meetings are funded by the European Commission 
at a total amount of 14 million ecus in 1992 and a budgeted 17 million 
in 1993. Although this may be an important first step, it remains unclear 
51. This one also dates from 1986, based on an agreement signed between the company 
and the International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Unions (IUF) and its European 
affiliate, the European Committee of Food, Catering and Allied Workers' Unions (ECF), 
Northrup and others (1988, pp. 535-36). 
52. Northrup and others (1988, p. 540). 
53. BR-Kontakt (newsletter of the VW general works council at Wolfsburg) (June and 
September, 1990). 
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both how many of the new committees will walk on their own feet when 
EC funding expires and to what extent information may expand into 
consultation and more substantive participation. 
To summarize, the evidence presents a consistent picture of an unsuc-
cessful but protracted and continuing union-led campaign for Commu-
nity-wide WPM rights. Negotiated WPM does exist, however, at the 
national level, especially in Germany. 
WPM at the National Level 
Established worker rights will have to be defended in the new Europe 
from the national level; it is from this basis that cross-national efforts to 
expand negotiated WPM will be built. The following sections consider 
negotiated WPM in the member states, with an emphasis on Germany; 
briefer looks at France, Britain, and Italy; and a glance at the remaining 
eight countries. 
Germany 
The German version of WPM, known as codetermination (Mitbestim-
mung), is an integral part of an industrial relations system that has been 
widely recognized for its success. There are two poles to codetermina-
tion: employee participation on company supervisory boards and elected 
works councils at the plant and firm levels. The rights and obligations of 
worker representatives and management at both levels are spelled out in 
detailed national legislation passed in 1951, 1952, 1972, and 1976.54 
Board representation, although not insignificant, is the least important 
of the two poles of codetermination. Supervisory boards meet only a few 
times a year, with day-to-day decisions made by a separate management 
board, which is, however, elected by the supervisory board. For the 
worker representatives on these boards (usually works councilors and 
union representatives), these meetings afford occasions to learn of com-
pany financial and strategic planning. The access to information and the 
ability to speak out at top levels has sometimes served works council and 
union interests and smoothed labor-management negotiations. Yet ex-
cept in the iron, steel, and coal industries, which have parity representa-
tion on the boards, labor's minority position on supervisory boards has 
54. For useful English-language introductions to codetermination in the Federal Re-
public, see Streeck (1984) and Berghahn and Karsten (1987). 
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given codetermination at this level a minor role compared to the daily 
activities of the works councils.55 
Works councils are legally independent of both union and manage-
ment, and they are democratically elected by the entire work force, blue 
and white collar employees. The public sector essentially has the same 
arrangement in personnel councils. Representatives serve part time at 
smaller firms, and there is a mix of full- and part-time councilors at 
larger firms. All works council costs are paid by the firm. 
Works councils are empowered by law, precedent, and plant- and firm-
level agreements to receive full information and consult with manage-
ment prior to the implementation of decisions affecting personnel. In 
specified areas, works councils have veto rights, giving true meaning to 
the term "codetermination."56 
How does this works council system work in practice? From a man-
agement point of view, there are many actions a firm cannot take without 
first consulting the works council. In such areas as the introduction of 
new technology and job design, management is required to inform the 
works council and listen to comments and suggestions prior to imple-
mentation.57 In these areas, management often ignores the wishes of the 
works council once the consultation obligation is fulfilled. But in other 
areas, management must either gain the assent of the works council or, 
in the event of stalemate, submit the matter to binding arbitration. Under 
the Works Constitution Act, works councils have codetermination rights 
in the areas of working hours, piecework rates and bonuses, and per-
formance monitoring (Article 87); working conditions in cases where 
employers have violated accepted principles of suitable job design 
(Article 91); hiring, firing, transfers, assignment to pay groupings, 
or job classifications (Articles 95 and 99); and training and retraining 
(Article 98). 
In spite of West German industry's often cited shop-floor flexibility, 
given the myriad personnel issues involved, management is not free to 
reorganize work without extensive discussion with the works council.58 
While decisionmaking may be slowed in this consensus-building process 
(and the outcome may be altered), once agreement is reached manage-
55. The unions waged a major battle in the 1970s to pass new legislation for parity 
codetermination on company boards. Although this effort increased the number of worker 
representatives on the boards of large firms, the goal of parity was not achieved for indus-
tries besides coal and steel. 
56. Adams and Rummel (1977, pp. 7-8). 
57. Works Constitution Act, Article 90. 
58. Streeck (1984); Streeck (1987); Thelen (1991). 
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ment has an important ally in the works council for winning work force 
acceptance and smoothing implementation. 
Germany also has a strong and fairly cohesive labor movement orga-
nized into one principal labor federation (the DGB), itself composed of 
sixteen industrial unions. From 1978 until unification, union member-
ship density of the employed work force in West Germany was stable at 
around 40 percent.59 Relations between unions and works councils are 
typically close: works councils, especially in the larger firms, are usually 
dominated by union activists who work closely with the local union 
office.60 
At the regional level, fairly centralized unions and employer associa-
tions conduct nationally coordinated collective bargaining for entire sec-
tors, establishing the framework for wages, working conditions, and 
hours within which works councils and managers operate. The unions, 
with substantial resources at the national level, are in a position to offer 
works councils important advice on strategy, bargaining, key issues, and 
daily operations. This is especially true of the larger unions such as IG 
Metall and works councils at the larger firms. 
The degrees of influence and independence of works councils within 
firms differ widely: variations are identifiable by industry, firm size, and 
plant history. Tensions also exist between works councils and unions. 
Works councils have been criticized for plant egoism, and there is a con-
siderable literature in Germany on this problem.61 Nevertheless, observ-
ers have maintained that the particular German institutions of WPM 
have contributed to the stability of union influence in Germany (and even 
modest expansion in some areas) at a time of general union decline else-
where.62 Works councilors' capacity to engage actively in WPM from a 
perspective independent of management would be much weaker without 
inclusive unions committed to using the institutions of codetermination 
strategically. If anything, in the past decade the substance of WPM in 
Germany has expanded as both unions and employers have focused in-
creasing attention on works councils in an era of industrial restructuring, 
work reorganization, and decentralized bargaining. 
Finally, German codetermination has made a substantial positive con-
59. Streeck (1988, p. 20); Niedenhoff (1990, p. 11). 
60. In the 1990 nationwide works council elections, 75 percent of elected works coun-
cilors were union members, with 92 percent of these coming from unions of the dominant 
DGB federation (Niedenhoff 1990, pp. 11-12). The DGB share of works council member-
ship has grown steadily since 1978. 
61. See, for example, Hohn (1988). 
62. See Streeck (1984); Thelen (1991); Turner (1991). 
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tribution to a level of national economic and industrial success that is 
unparalleled in Europe. Codetermination has compelled managers to 
plan carefully, use internal labor markets, train and retrain, and organize 
personnel effectively. It has pushed management to collect information 
from and achieve consensus with representatives of its work force, to 
collect and thoroughly organize information for dissemination to the 
works council and supervisory board, to rationalize and raise productiv-
ity, and to move into more profitable markets in its product strategies.63 
By the same token, codetermination has given works councils and unions 
(and perhaps workers as well) an enhanced stake in the successful oper-
ation of the plant and firm. 
As the pace of European economic integration quickens, the minimum 
requirement for German unions is the defense of codetermination at 
home.64 But to the extent that so-called creeping deregulation under-
mines national institutions, the best defense may be a good offense.65 
German unionists worry that investment will flee to countries where 
firms are unburdened by codetermination (not to mention high wages) 
and that European-level decisions will weaken protections at home. (For 
example, multinationals based in another country might be allowed to 
produce in Germany using their own weaker versions of WPM.) Unions 
are concerned that the proposed European Company Statute could dis-
place German national law in areas such as codetermination in the event 
a merger replaces a domestic employer with a foreign one.66 Franz Stein-
kiihler, president of IG Metall (the dominant German union), argues that 
German workers will lose what they have fought for at home if German-
style industrial democracy does not spread to Europe as a whole.67 
These concerns have driven German unions to take leading roles 
within the ETUC and other European-level groupings such as the Euro-
pean Metalworkers' Federation.68 They have also driven German unions 
to seek agreement with their own employers. In 1989, for example, the 
DGB and the BDA (the German employers association) issued a joint 
statement calling for general minimum social standards and the align-
ment of labor law at a high level within the EC.69 But as one might ex-
63. Streeck (1987). 
64. Streeck (1991). 
65. Mosley, (1990, p. 163). 
66. Mosley, (1990, p. 156). 
67. Steinkuhler (1988, pp. 7-21). See also "German Involvement 'Must Be EC 
Model,'" Industrial Relations Europe, vol. 16 (August 1988), pp. 1, 8. 
68. Streeck 1990, pp. 11-12. 
69. "Employers, Unions Unite over EC Labour Reforms," Industrial Relations Europe, 
vol. 17 (August 1989), p. 6. 
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pect, German employers are of two minds on these issues. While they 
would love to see other European competitors face the same codetermi-
nation constraints they face, triey want the opportunity to do business in 
other countries in a less constrained way and would not protest if the 
single European market increased their own leverage at home vis a vis 
their union and works council counterparts. Therefore, as the Social 
Charter debate escalated, German employers shifted away from their 
common ground with the unions and arrived at a moderate position sup-
porting concepts such as WPM but opposing their mandatory extension 
throughout the EC. Chancellor Kohl's attempt in 1989 to bring the two 
sides together for a common position in the European debate failed. 
German unions, however, will continue to lead in efforts to expand 
European-level WPM. Strategies will vary and evolve. For example, there 
is only qualified support for Community WPM directives among the 
ranks of German union leaders, a reflection of their concern that such 
measures could undermine Germany's own stronger requirements. The 
DGB favors minimum standards for information and consultation to 
build up national WPM in the member states and perhaps lay the 
groundwork for future, more substantial and successful European-level 
measures. 
France 
Although less developed and more limited, WPM is nonetheless wide-
spread in France. At .plant and firm levels, workers are represented 
through staff delegations (delegations du personnel), trade union sec-
tions (sections syndicaux), and works committees (comites d'entre-
prise).70 The staff delegations monitor company rules and present griev-
ances, but they have no bargaining power. The union representatives can 
engage in collective bargaining and represent worker interests in other 
ways. They also put up slates of candidates for election to the works 
committee, itself designated to play a limited role in WPM. Established 
by law in 1946, works committees are elected bodies at firms with 50 or 
more employees, with rights to information and consultation. Through 
the works committees, workers and unionists receive advance informa-
70. For brief descriptions of the three basic mechanisms of representation, see IDE 
(1981, pp. 189-91); and European Trade Union Institute (1990b, pp. 43-47). There is 
only limited supervisory board participation for worker representatives in France. Two 
works committee members may attend supervisory or management board meetings in an 
advisory capacity without voting rights. At state-owned firms and at certain limited liability 
companies, a small number of worker representatives may sit on the board with voting 
rights, European Trade Union Institute (1990b, p. 47). 
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tion regarding company plans, giving them the opportunity to mobilize 
if necessary. But the committees themselves are chaired by the plant man-
ager and have no formal joint decisionmaking rights except in managing 
recreational facilities and activities. In most cases this latter area is the 
major preoccupation of the works committees; on the average they de-
rive two-thirds of their budgets from revenues generated in the recrea-
tional programs, with the remaining third provided by the company.71 
At some large firms such as EDF (the national electric company), the 
works committees are powerful bodies. Their activities often overlap 
with union representatives' work. Most of the elected committee mem-
bers are unionists; at large firms they are often freed from normal work 
duties by virtue of their positions on the committees. Yet even in these 
cases, works committees generally have not advanced beyond informa-
tion rights into more extensive WPM for a number of reasons: employers 
are opposed; French unions have rejected in principle participation 
in management decisionmaking although one of the principal labor fed-
erations, the CFDT, supports worker decisionmaking or "autogestion"; 
and plant representation is typically fragmented into several contending 
union sections who may carry their rivalry into their works committee 
efforts.72 
The French labor movement is divided into six principal, often con-
tentious union federations (CGT, CFDT, FO, CFTC, CGC, and FEN). 
The three largest, the CGT, CFDT, and FO, are all on the left (the CFDT 
and FO are socialist, but bitter rivals; the CGT is communist and still the 
largest). Ideological divisions and organizational rivalries among them 
are intense. Ever since the breakdown of efforts to form a coalition be-
tween the socialist and communist parties in 1977, and between the 
CFDT and CGT in 1980, the French labor movement has been in decline. 
This has persisted, especially for the CGT, even under socialist govern-
ments.73 France is the only industrial democracy with a lower union 
membership density (12 percent or less) than the United States. Divided 
and in decline, the unions have hardly been in a position to promote 
expanded WPM through the works committees or in other ways, even if 
they were inclined to go in that direction. In fact, in the 1989 works 
71. "Works Councils Cost Firms 'FF1,500 a Head Yearly,'" Industrial Relations Eu-
rope, vol. 17 (October 1988), p. 4. 
72. See Ross (1982, pp. 18-19) concerning the relegation of the works committees to 
marginal status in the early postwar period after the committees were established by union-
backed legislation. 
73. Bridgford (1990). 
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committee elections, nonunion candidates for the first time won the larg-
est number of elected committee positions for France as a whole.74 The 
expansion of WPM in France in the past decade has been significantly 
employer led. Managers have promoted various forms of direct partici-
pation, including quality circles and expression groups.75 Such programs 
aim at complementing the works committees on the shop floor; they also 
appear to have had the effect of further undermining the unions.76 
As for Europe, the socialist party and the government support worker 
protections embodied in the Social Charter and its action program, in-
cluding expanded information and consultation rights. But the French 
perspective, even the socialist and union views, are decidedly different 
from the German union perspective. As Jansen and Kissler put it: "Rad-
ical democratic traditions, overlapping an individualism which has a def-
inite existence in France, give rise to the fact that common interests 
hardly ever arise in the area of industrial relations. . . . The co-
determination model favoured by Germany is rejected virtually univer-
sally in France. Political groups and trade unions object that co-
determination presumes harmony to exist where, in reality, conflict 
rules."77 
United Kingdom 
There is little to say about WPM in the United Kingdom, which has 
no legal provisions for either works councils or committees or worker 
board participation. Although in the 1970s The Bullock Report (issued 
by a royal committee) recommended participation by employee repre-
sentatives on the unitary boards of large British firms, this recommen-
dation was never acted upon. Experiments in this direction at British 
Steel and the Post Office were abandoned when Thatcher took office in 
1979.78 
In the place of formal works courfcils, employer-initiated or negoti-
ated "joint consultation machinery" has been established at many firms 
(34 percent of firms surveyed in 1984 in the Workplace Industrial Rela-
74. Nationwide works committee elections yielded the following results: nonunion, 
26.4 percent; CGT, 25.1 percent; CFDT 21 percent; FO, 11.2 percent; CGC, 5.5 percent; 
CFTC, 4.6 percent; others, 6.3 percent. "Work Council Elections Blow for Unions," Euro-
pean Industrial Relations Review, vol. 200 (September 1990), p. 6. 
75. Bridgford (1990, p. 132). 
76. Bridgford (1990, pp. 132-33); Delamotte (1988). 
77. Jansen and Kissler (1987, p. 392.) 
78. European Trade Union Institute (1990b, p. 53). 
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tions Survey).79 But according to at least one analysis, these joint con-
sultation bodies are an illusory phenomenon, offering little basis for 
substantive WPM or its expansion.80 
As we have seen, the conservative government has been adamantly 
opposed not only to mandated WPM at home and in Europe, but the 
entire Social Charter of the EC.81 The Tories under Thatcher framed 
the issue as one of employee involvement versus participation. Voluntary 
employer-led, firm-level involvement is good, they argued; mandated 
WPM is bad. The former is in keeping with the voluntarist traditions of 
British industrial relations; as for the latter, however, "formalism and 
legalism have often been found to f>e the enemies of effective employee 
involvement."82 
There has indeed been an expansion of employee involvement pro-
grams at the firm level in Britain in the past decade as employers have 
responded to market pressures for rationalization and a greater employee 
contribution to the production process. As in other countries, there have 
been experiments with shop-floor teams, quality circles, and labor-
management cooperation. In many cases, however, these experiments 
have foundered. The reasons for failure include longstanding adversarial 
relations, craft demarcations, and the widespread perception that such 
programs were part of the general offensive by government and employ-
ers against union influence.83 Meanwhile, union membership density in 
the United Kingdom declined under the Thatcher regime from 54 percent 
in 1979 to 42 percent in 1987.84 
In spite of the government's hard line in European circles, 76 percent 
of British managers surveyed in 1989 expressed a willingness to accept 
some form of EC legislation on WPM.85 It is British unions, however, 
who in important cases have altered their previous views and become 
supporters of European integration, the Social Charter, and expanded 
WPM rights. The Trades Union Council (TUC) is explicit in its goal of 
regaining through alliances and legislation at the European level some of 
the influence it has lost at home since 1979. Renewed interest in WPM 
appears to be an important part of this new focus. 
79. European Trade Union Institute (1990b, p. 52). 
80. Madnnes (1985). 
81. Story (1990, pp. 160-13). 
82. According to a recent government report on employee involvement cited in Euro-
pean Industrial Relations Review, vol. 192 (January 1990), p. 24. 
83. See Madnnes (1985); Wood (1988, pp. 231-39). 
84. Towers (1989, p. 175). 
85. European Industrial Relations Review, vol. 192 (January' 1990), p. 24. 
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In 1989, for example, one of the TUC's bargaining checklists cited the 
proposed European Company Statute "model" for information, consul-
tation, and worker participation on company boards. The TUC encour-
aged member unions to take up these issues in bargaining, arguing that 
"the 1992 programme gives unions and management an opportunity to 
test in practice the claim by many" employers that 'voluntary' arrange-
ments are preferable to statutory rights."86 In 1990, the General, Muni-
cipal, and Boilermakers (GMB) union directed its locals to use the Social 
Charter as a checklist in collective bargaining, a practice that other 
unions were expected to follow. In its first coup, GMB announced an 
agreement with Keiper Recaro (a subsidiary of a German firm) that in-
cludes, based on the charter, both worker representation on the company 
board and the establishment of a works council.87 
The United Kingdom remains, however, one of the least developed EC 
member states insofar as WPM is concerned. The government under 
John Major remains the primary opponent in EC government circles of 
expanded WPM rights, while British employers have banded together 
with other European employers to oppose mandatory measures. 
Italy 
Like the British, and unlike the French, Italian unions have become 
converts to the WPM cause. Also like the British, Italian unions are seek-
ing remedies to reverse a decline that began in 1980, and they are starting 
from a minimal base regarding rights to information, consultation, and 
participation. 
Italy has no legal provisions for worker participation on company 
boards. The only major exceptions are agreements signed in the mid-
1980s to establish labor-management advisory bodies at the state-owned 
industrial groups (IRI, ENI, EFIM). Established at the national, regional, 
sectoral, and firm levels, these bodies receive information and discuss 
business strategies, organization of work, and industrial relations.88 
Works councils exist at the plant level, but they have only rudimentary 
statutory definition aside from their right to exist, provided in the 1970 
Workers' Statute. They are essentially union groups, composed primarily 
of delegates who are members of the three main union confederations 
86. European Industrial Relations Review, vol. 185 (June 1989), p. 25. 
87. Industrial Relations Europe (June 1990), p. 7; "First Social Charter Agreement," 
European Industrial Relations Review, vol. 198 (July 1990), p. 10. 
88. European Trade Union Institute (1990b, p. 71). 
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(CGIL, CISL, and UIL). The primary function of these groups is to en-
gage management at the local level in collective bargaining. Although 
national sectoral agreements give them rights to information on invest-
ment plans, new technologies, and employment matters, the works coun-
cils do not conceive of themselves as instruments for consultation or par-
ticipation in management decisionmaking.89 
By most accounts, the works councils have declined considerably in 
influence from their heyday in the 1970s (the upsurge following the hot 
autumn of 1969). Part of their problem, and arguably a major cause for 
union decline in Italy, has been the fragmentation of Italian labor into 
three rival confederations.90 Since the breakup of Italian labor's confed-
eration of confederations in 1984, the three groups have often been at 
odds at national and local levels. Union membership density dropped 
from 48 percent in 1980 to/40 percent in 1986.91 The works councils 
have all too often lacked common strategies both toward management 
and toward the employees they represent.92 Meanwhile, as in Britain, 
managers have pursued new employer-led forms of WPM, such as qual-
ity circles, that circumvent the unions and the works councils to involve 
workers directly. 
In an effort to regain influence and to breathe new life into the works 
councils, Italian unions seek expanded information and consultation 
rights, from the national and sectoral levels to the plant level. In bargain-
ing with Confindustria (the national employers' association) the unions 
have demanded new consultation rights regarding work reorganization 
and a reformed works council structure.93 Among union proposals to 
reform plant-level representation is one that calls for a dual structure 
composed of union works committees with exclusive bargaining rights 
and works councils elected by the entire work force with enhanced par-
ticipation rights.94 
Union division and employer opposition remain the major barriers to 
expanded WPM rights at home, even as Italian unions add their voice 
to the demand for European-level rights. Italian employers, for their part, 
ally themselves with the general European employer opposition to man-
datory measures, while expanding employer-led involvement programs 
89. European Trade Union Institute (1990b, pp. 69-70). 
90. Pellegrini (1987). 
91. Negrelli and Santi (1990, p. 190). 
92. Negrelli and Santi (1990). 
93. "IR Talks Yield First Fruit," Industrial Relations Europe, vol. 17 (June 1989), p. 3. 
94. European Industrial Relations Review, vol. 202 (November 1990), p. 21. 
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Table 3-1. Negotiated WPM in EC Member States, as of 1990 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Great Britain 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Works councils 
Yes 
Yes2 
Yes 
Yes' 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yesa 
Yesa 
Yes 
Yes 
Board ra< 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Sources: European Trade Union Institute (1990a, various pages); European Industrial Relations Review; Indus-
trial Relations Europe. 
a. Some codetermination. 
at many of their own plants. Meanwhile, the Italian government, like the 
German government, has taken a middle position but in the runup to 
Maastricht added its voice to those successfully demanding a shift to 
qualified majority voting for all social issues, including WPM. 
Negotiated WPM in the EC Member States: A Summary 
Negotiated WPM is summarized in Table 3-1 for all EC member 
states. Countries that have only limited works councils or board mem-
berships in certain sectors (such as the public sector) are not counted in 
this tabulation, which considers broad societywide provisions. Typically, 
these provisions are mandated by law, although in the Danish case works 
councils are established by centralized collective bargaining agreement. 
In only two of the twelve cases do EC countries have societywide com-
pany board representation for employees. In both cases, Denmark and 
Germany, works councils are generally considered a more significant ave-
nue for WPM than is board representation. Ten of the twelve countries, 
however, have works councils throughout the economy. In four the coun-
cils have some codetermination rights (Denmark, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands); in the remaining countries the councils 
have information and consultation rights only, and in Italy they are pri-
marily instruments of collective bargaining rather than WPM. Works 
councils in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands 
date to the immediate postwar period or earlier; in Greece, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, and Spain works councils have been established only since the 
74 I Lowell Turner 
1970s. (Greece's are the youngest; its works councils were established by 
law in 1988.) 
A picture of widely contrasting national arrangements for negotiated 
WPM emerges from the preceding presentation. On the whole, company 
board participation plays a minor role. Works councils, by contrast, are 
widespread and appear to be increasing in importance, although they 
vary substantially among the EC member states in form, influence, and 
rights. Union members are typically active on the works councils, while 
the level of union influence on and strategy toward works councils varies 
widely from country to country. Union interest in negotiated WPM by 
way of works councils appears widespread. 
The evidence shows the importance of the WPM issue. We find sub-
stantial national bases for negotiated WPM. This is true especially in 
Germany, with the strongest economy among the EC members, but it 
holds in other countries to varying degrees as well. Proponents of WPM, 
however, can expect to face great difficulties in building new institutions 
of Community-wide WPM when such broad institutional diversity exists 
among member states and when negotiated WPM plays only a weak role 
in many (as in Britain, Ireland, Italy, and France). Contemporary advo-
cates of the expansion of information, consultation, and participation 
rights—primarily unions and their allies—have a great deal of work to 
do at both national and European levels. 
Impacts and Prospects 
Because only two of the twelve EC countries have employee representa-
tion on company boards, it is difficult to imagine a successful coalition 
that could institute such a requirement at the European level for Euro-
pean firms. The prospects for European-level works councils seem 
brighter, however, since all but two of the member states have these in 
one form or another already. And in both of the exceptions (Britain and 
Ireland), national union federations have moved away from traditional 
positions to show new support for negotiated WPM. German unions, 
with both strong works councils and a strong labor movement (and 
this is no coincidence), can be expected to continue to lead 
a pan-European campaign for the expansion of negotiated WPM, pri-
marily in the form of mandated works councils with information and 
consultation rights (at least) for large firms doing business in the EC. 
Industrial relations practices, including mechanisms of participation, 
Worker Participation in Management in the Single Market I y$ 
are products of national histories. As such, they represent past economic 
developments and political struggles embodied in present institutions; 
they tend to be entrenched and quite resistant to change. It is unlikely 
that current market integration developments will Rave a radical short-
term effect on WPM within the EC. In the longer run, however, the Eu-
ropean project may indeed result in or be accompanied by substantial 
institutional change both within the member states and at the Commu-
nity level. 
New and growing interest in "WPM on all sides is rooted most impor-
tantly in market-driven pressures that have challenged previously stable 
patterns of industrial relations.95 To the extent that WPM is a loose con-
cept and means different things to different people, it sometimes becomes 
politically possible.96 Such a dynamic is apparent in the current European 
case; but the actual shape and content of WPM as it spreads to new areas 
remain to be determined. 
In any case, expanded WPM is on its way in Europe, just as it is in 
the United States and elsewhere. Managers are inspired by the Japanese 
example; unionists in many cases by the German example. But the criti-
cal question that unions are raising in the current European debate is: 
will it be employer led or will it be negotiated? Will it depend on em-
ployer intention, goodwill, and perhaps enlightenment, or will workers 
throughout the EC have rights to information, consultation, and partic-
ipation as they now do in some member states? 
A major 1970s research project on industrial democracy in Europe 
concluded that participation at all levels—shop floor, management, com-
pany board—is more effective where backed by legislation.97 This study 
also concluded that legislation is more likely to exist where both labor 
and management have strong central federations. But such institutions 
do not now exist, and will not come into being in the foreseeable future 
at the EC level or within several of the member states. Thus, in a single 
market project that has been significantly business led and deregulatory 
in intent, employers retain the political advantage and the debate on so-
cial issues has reached a stalemate. European-level stalemate leads us to 
expect the following prospects for WPM: a continuing expansion of em-
ployer-led involvement programs on a firm-by-firm basis with no corre-
sponding expansion of workers' and their representatives' formal rights; 
continued national efforts to expand WPM rights and institutions (as in 
95. Piore and Sabel (1984); Boyer (1988). 
96. Strauss (1982, pp. 182-83). 
97. IDE (1981); Strauss (1982, pp. 221-22). 
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Ireland, Italy, and Britain) driven by unions' growing interest in promot-
ing WPM rights and taking advantage of existing mechanisms, even in-
formal ones; a growing interest among unions in cross-national collab-
oration; and a continued impasse for efforts to create a European firm 
and a European industrial relations arena. 
On the whole, although WPM has become a major issue and cam-
paign for European unions, so far the outcome has not been favorable to 
the spread of the formal rights that unions advocate. This lack of success 
is due to the great diversity of form and substance in WPM among the 
member states; the difficulty of institution building, especially as con-
cerns new regulation, within the current employer- and government-led 
European deregulatory project; and unions' relative political weakness. 
This last aspect is itself a result of great cross-national differences in 
union structure, influence, and strategy; declining union influence in 
many member states since 1980; and German unions' preoccupation 
with German unification since 1990. 
One prospect remains, however, that might shift the battle for nego-
tiated WPM in a more favorable direction for its union proponents. 
Many unionists, disappointed by the European-level deadlock, have 
shifted their sights toward incremental change. This would include the 
expansion of WPM rights within the member states as well as the spread 
of information and consultation procedures initiated at the European 
level in specific areas such as health and safety.98 Such incremental 
change could later provide a stronger institutional basis for more gener-
alized WPM rights in the EC." A shift to qualified majority voting on 
social issues, now foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty social protocol, 
would certainly enhance these prospects, as would a possible expansion 
of the legal powers of the European Parliament. 
The long-term outcome of these developments for WPM (as for other 
social issues) in the EC is contingent on politics and the capacity for 
institutional transformation within and across the member states. The 
prospects for unions and negotiated WPM do not at present look prom-
ising. But politics is nothing if not uncertain. 
98. This perspective counters the commonly accepted notion that European economic 
integration will devalue national institutions (Streeck 1991). In currently evolving struc-
tures, the subsidiarity principle relegates considerable (and in some cases new) implemen-
tation and enforcement precisely to national institutions. The EC regulates relations be-
tween national governments but does not replace them. 
99. See Wallace (1990) on the potentially transformative effects of accumulated incre-
mental change. 
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